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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes to carve out a new position in the scientific realism/antirealism
debate and argue that it captures some of the most important realist and some of the
most important antirealist considerations. The view, briefly stated, is that there is always
a fact of the matter about whether the singular statements science gives us are literally
true, but there is no fact of the matter about whether the non-singular statements science
gives us are literally true. I call this view singularist semirealism. Singularist semirealism
sideswith scientific realismwith regards to singular statements but it is an antirealist view
with regards to non-singular statements. In this sense, singularist semirealism could be
considered to be ‘the best of both worlds’.
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1 Introduction
The scientific realism/antirealism debate has been, and remains, quite confus-
ing. Different philosophers interpret these labels differently and it is not even
clear that there is one single debate between scientific realism and antirealism
(see Newton-Smith [1978]; Hacking [1983] for taxonomies). According to a
widespread formulation of scientific realism, ‘scientific theories are either true
or false independent of what we know: science at least aims at the truth and the
truth is how the world is’ (Hacking [1983], p. 27). In other words, science aims
to give us literally true claims about the world and there is a fact of the matter,
independent of us, about how the world is.
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Note that this definition has two conjuncts: one about what science aims
to do and the other about the relation between scientific theories and the
world. Scientific antirealists can deny either of these two conjuncts. They
can deny that science aims to give us literally true claims about the world.
This would give rise to epistemic antirealism. Or they can deny that there is
a fact of the matter about whether these claims are true. This would land us
in ontological antirealism. As scientific antirealism is, on the face of it, a
negative claim—the denial of scientific realism—there is also a wide variety
of antirealist proposals as to what the realist concept of truth should be
replaced with.
My main focus in this article is the debate between scientific realism and
ontological antirealism. As a result, I put the ‘epistemic’ or ‘aim of science’
conjunct in the above formulation aside. And there are independent reasons
for doing so. Hacking’s definition—like the one offered by Van Fraassen’s,
who characterizes scientific realism as the view that ‘science aims to give us
[. . .] a literally true story of what the world is like’ (Van Fraassen [1980], p.
8)—relies heavily on the concept of the ‘aim of science’. But, there are some
familiar worries about what constitutes the aim of such a complex social en-
terprise (see, for example, Rowbottom [2010], Section 2). As I want to focus
on the debate between scientific realists and ontological antirealists, I can
ignore the appeal to the ‘aim of science’.
Thus, the half of Hacking’s statement of scientific realism that I will focus
on is that according to which ‘scientific theories are either true or false inde-
pendent of what we know’ (Hacking [1983], p. 27). In other words, there is
always a fact of the matter about whether statements science gives us are
literally true. Ontological antirealists deny this claim.
This article proposes to carve out a new position in the scientific realism/
antirealism debate and argue that it captures the most important realist and
the most important antirealist considerations. The view, briefly stated, is that
there is always a fact of the matter about whether the singular statements
science gives us are literally true, but there is no fact of the matter about
whether non-singular statements are literally true. I call this view singularist
semirealism. I call it semirealism because it is a realist view with regards to
singular claims but an antirealist view with regards to non-singular claims.
And I call it singularist in order to differentiate it from other versions of
semirealism (especially Chakravartty [1998], [2007]). Many realists will find
my view too antirealist and maybe some antirealists will find it too realist. It is
pointless to argue about labels; my aim is to preserve something from the
advantages of both realism and antirealism.
There have been a number of attempts at reconciling scientific realism and
scientific antirealism. The most famous of these is probably structural realism
(see, for example, Worrall [1989]; Ladyman [1998]): we should be realist about
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structure but not about anything else. Like structural realism, my account also
aims to find the ‘best of both worlds’ in this debate. However, it attempts to do
that in a new way: my claim is that we should be realist about singular claims
but not about non-singular ones.
2 Truth and Correctness
We can make a distinction between scientific realism/antirealism about
theoretical entities and scientific realism/antirealism about theories (see
Hacking [1983], pp. 27–8). Realism about entities is the view that theoretical
(unobservable) entities that scientific theories postulate really do exist.
Realism about scientific theories, as we have seen, is the view that ‘scientific
theories are either true or false independent of what we know’ (Hacking
[1983], pp. 27). I am interested in the second debate here and leave those
bits of the debate that are about unobservable theoretical entities on the side.
Scientific realism about theories is normally defined in terms of the truth of
scientific theories. But it has been pointed out that there may be too much
emphasis on linguistic representations in this formulation; scientific theories
do not always come in linguistic form (see the rich recent literature on scien-
tific models and Godfrey-Smith [2003], pp. 186–9 for a summary of its rele-
vance to the scientific realism debate). Thus, if we want to formulate scientific
realism in such a way that it is general enough to cover all these cases, we need
to find a way of including non-linguistic representations too.
In order to avoid these problems, we should replace the concept of truth
with the concept of correctness. Scientific realism is the view according to
which there is always a fact of the matter about whether the representations
science gives us are correct.
Representations attribute properties to entities. Say, a representation attri-
butes property P to an entity e. If e in fact has property P, then this represen-
tation is correct. Scientific realists claim that there is always a fact of the
matter about whether representations that science gives us are correct. That
is, if science gives us a representation that attributes property P to an entity e,
there is always a fact of the matter about whether e is in fact P. Scientific
antirealists, on the other hand, deny that there is a fact of the matter about
whether this representations is correct, about whether e is in fact P.
What is important for the purposes of this paper is that depending on what
property P and entity e are, we may get different answers if we ask whether
there is a fact of the matter about whether e is P. I will suggest that if P is a
property-token, then there is a fact of the matter about whether e is P. But if P
is a property-type, then there is no such fact of the matter. But let us proceed
more slowly.
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3 Property-Tokens and Property-Types
What is the relation between property-tokens and property-types? The color
of my laptop is a property-token. Property-tokens are particulars. Gray is a
property-type. What is the relation between the two? There seems to be two
possible views:
(a*) There is a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs
to, or is an instantiation of, a property-type
(b*) There is no fact of the matter about whether a property-token be-
longs to, or is an instantiation of, a property-type.
Three comments: First, when I say that ‘there is no fact of the matter about
whether a property-token belongs to, or is an instantiation of, a property-
type’, this means that there no mind-independent fact of the matter about this.
Second, the difference between (a*) and (b*) is not to be confused with the
classic realism/nominalism distinction about property-types. In fact, both
(a*) and (b*) are consistent with both realism and nominalism. More specif-
ically, (a*) does not exclude nominalism. One could think that property-types
are resemblance-classes of property-tokens (or of tropes, see Williams [1953],
p. 81; Campbell [1981], p. 134; Bacon [1995], p. 18) and, as a result, there is a
fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to a property-type,
but property-types are merely resemblance-classes of property-tokens.
Third, there is a potential ambiguity in this way of drawing the distinction.
It may be the case, after all, that there are some property-types that are such
that there is a fact of the matter about whether a property-token is an instan-
tiation of it, but there are some other property-types, where there isn’t such
fact of the matter.
An old and respectable way of characterizing the relation between
property-types is the determinable-determinate relation (Johnston [1921];
Funkhouser [2006]). To use a classic example, being red is a determinate of
being colored, but a determinable of being scarlet. Without giving a full ana-
lysis of the determinable-determinate relation, some of the most important
features of this relation need to be pointed out. First, it is an irreflexive,
asymmetric, and transitive relation between property-types. There are
many ways of being red and being scarlet is one of these: for something to
be scarlet is for it to be red, in a specific way. If something is red, it also has to
be of a certain specific shade of red; there is no such thing as being red
simpliciter.
The determinable-determinate relation is a relative one: the same property,
for example, of being red, can be the determinate of the determinable being
colored, but the determinable of the determinate being scarlet. Thus,
the determinable-determinate relation gives us hierarchical ordering of
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property-types in a given property-space. Property-types with no further
determinates, if there are any, are known as super-determinates.
In the light of this, we seem to have three options1:
(a) For any property-type (determinable or super-determinate), there is a
fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to, or is an
instantiation of, this property-type.
(b) For super-determinate, but not for determinable, property-types, there
is a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to, or is
an instantiation of, this property-type.
(c) For no property-type is there a fact of the matter about whether a
property-token belongs to, or is an instantiation of, this property-type.
The question is, then, whetherwe should endorse (a), (b), or (c). If we accept (a),
then there is a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to,
or is an instantiation of, a determinable property-type. In other words, (a)
commits us to the existence of mind-independent determinable property-types.
There are two versions of this claim, depending on whether one has nom-
inalist or realist leanings. If one is nominalist about property-types, then
(a) amounts to endorsing the existence of loose resemblance classes of
property-tokens, that is, resemblance classes defined in terms of non-exact
resemblance (Williams [1953], p. 81; Campbell [1981], p. 134). If one is realist,
then (a) amounts to positing the existence of determinable universals
(Armstrong [1978]). There are problems with the former way of thinking
about determinables as loose resemblance classes. David Manley argues
that any such attempt would face familiar worries that allegedly made
object resemblance nominalism lose its appeal: the companionship problem
and the imperfect community problem (Manley [2002], especially pp. 86–7;
these problems are first raised in Goodman [1951]). Further, as Bacon points
out, this way of defining resemblance classes would require a primitive simi-
larity measure for each property-type, something not exactly in line with the
general nominalist sentiment towards parsimony (Bacon [1995], p. 18).
But there is a more general worry about assuming the mind-independent
existence of determinable property-types (see Gillett-Rives [2005] for a
detailed overview). David Lewis made a famous distinction between sparse
and abundant (or, natural and unnatural) properties, that is, property-types
(Lewis [1983], [1986]). Abundant properties, as Lewis puts it, ‘carve reality at
the joints – and everywhere else as well. If it’s distinctions we want, too much
1 The options (a), (b), and (c) do not exhaust the logical space for possible views about the relation
between property-types and property-tokens. The forth possible view is that for determinable,
but not for super-determinate, property-types, there is a fact of the matter about whether a
property-token belongs to, or is an instantiation of, this property-type. I ignore this possibility
because it seems to combine the weaknesses of (b) and (c) without inheriting their strengths.
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structure is no better than none’ (Lewis [1983], p. 346). He concludes that we
need some other, more restricted, concept of properties, which he calls sparse
properties. Sparse properties (or perfectly natural properties) are ‘an e´lite
minority of special properties’ (Lewis [1983], p. 346); they are the properties
with ‘relevant causal powers’ (Lewis [1983], p. 347). But then the question is
whether determinable property-types have any causal powers. If they don’t,
then they cannot be sparse properties.
To use Shoemaker’s rhetoric, if properties are individuated by their causal
powers (Shoemaker [1979]) and determinables do not have causal powers,
then determinables are not properties. But do determinable properties have
causal powers? Although some have argued that they do (see especially Yablo
[1992]), the (weak) consensus is that they do not; only super-determinates have
causal powers (see Armstrong [1961], [1978]; Lewis [1983] and Crane [2009] for
a very thorough overview). Causal relevance is only one of seven desiderata
Lewis sets for natural properties and, taking all of them into consideration,
it seems that the least problematic account of natural properties is one that
takes these to be super-determinate (see Denby [2001]; Weatherson [2005];
Hawthorne [2006] for discussion). But if only super-determinate property-
types have causal powers (and satisfy the other six desiderata for sparse prop-
erties), then we have no reason to postulate the mind-independent existence of
determinable property-types (in any non-trivial, that is, non-abundant sense).
And this leads to (b).
There is a nominalist and a realist version of (b) as well. The nominalist
would say that super-determinate property-types are exact resemblance
classes of property-tokens (Williams [1953], p. 117; Bacon [1995], p. 18).
And the realist would say that all universals are super-determinate (Lewis
[1983] is flirting with this option, see especially p. 357 and see also his post-
humous Lewis [2009], where he says that perfectly natural properties are ‘not
at all [. . .] determinable’ (p. 204). This way of thinking about property-types
would leave open the question about how we can then talk about determinable
property-types, such as being red. I will talk about this in the discussion of (c),
but first I need to raise a problem that is specific to (b).
If we accept (b), we need to hold that there are such things as super-
determinate property-types (whether they are exact resemblance classes or
universals): property-types with no further determinates. This is an assump-
tion that many would be happy to make. W. E. Johnston, for example, who
introduced the determinable-determinate relation, takes the existence of
super-determinates as a ‘universally adopted postulate’ (Johnson [1921],
p. 185), and many agreed with him (see, for example, Armstrong [1961]).
But should we postulate the existence of such property-types? Why should
we assume that there are property-types that have no further determinates?
Wouldn’t it be possible that every determinate has further determinates? It has
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been argued that what Johnson called a ‘universally adopted postulate’ is in
fact false (see, for example, Sanford [2006]; Sorensen [2011]).
In short, if we deny that there are super-determinate property-types and
also deny (a), then (c) seems to be the only viable option remaining. But even if
we hold that there are super-determinate property-types and that there is a
fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to, or is an instan-
tiation of, a super-determinate property-type, this may not be a particularly
interesting fact of the matter from the point of view of the scientific realism/
antirealism debate, as the super-determinate property-types, if they really are
super-determinate, are unlikely to appear in the claims scientists make: no two
rabbits have exactly the same super-determinate properties (see Mayr [1959]
and Nanay [2010a]), and maybe not even two atoms do. Scientists often (ar-
guably, always) consider two property-tokens to be ‘the same’ for their pur-
poses even if they do not belong to, or are not instantiations of, the same
super-determinate property-type. So if we want to give an account of the
relation between property-tokens and property-types that is of any use to
scientists, we need to turn to (c).
Is (c) a crazy claim? I don’t think so. It is the simple view that there is no fact
of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to, or is an instantiation
of, a property-type, as property-types are our own groupings of property-
tokens. Property-tokens are out there, independent of us. Property-types
aren’t.
Think of property-tokens as points in a property-space (see Quine [1969];
Clark [2000] on the concept of property-space—Lewis also uses this metaphor
for highlighting the difference between natural and unnatural properties in
Lewis [2001], pp. 385–286). Some pairs of property-tokens resemble each
other more than others; they are closer together in this property-space.
Property-types are regions in the property-space.
One picture about this property-space is that there is a fact of the matter
about where the ‘true’ boundaries of the regions of this property-space lie:
there is a fact of the matter about where one natural property-type (one uni-
versal or one resemblance class of property-tokens) ends and where the other
begins. And there is one way of partitioning the property-space that cuts it at
its joints, that would divide it along the lines of natural properties. This is the
picture (a) and (b) take for granted.
Another, alternative picture is the following: Some pairs of property-
tokens are closer together in the property-space; they resemble each other
more than others. But property-types are our arbitrary ways of delineating
regions of this property-space. The property-space does not have joints: it
consists of lots of property-tokens, some close together, some further away
from each other. Property-types are our ways of grouping these points in the
property-space and the way we group property-tokens together depends on
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our interests. In other words, there is a fact of the matter about how similar
any two property-tokens are. But there is no fact of the matter about whether
a property-token belongs to a property-type (see also Nanay [2009a], [2010a],
[2011a], [2011b]).
To use an old analogy, property-tokens could be thought of as stars and
property-types as constellations (Cournot [1851]; Darwin [1859], p. 397;
Goodman [1978]; see Hacking [2007] for a good summary). There is a fact
of the matter about the distance between any two stars, but the constellations
of stars, like that Cassiopeia, are our own arbitrary groupings of some stars.
As Ian Hacking says, ‘they are convenient for navigators but the stars are
grouped together by people, not nature’ (Hacking [2007], p. 225). Similarly,
there is a fact of the matter about the degree of resemblance between any two
property-tokens, but, to paraphrase Hacking, property-types are property-
tokens ‘grouped together by people, not nature’. Does this mean that there
is no fact of the matter about which star belongs to which constellation? It
means that there is no mind-independent fact of the matter about which star
belongs to which constellation because constellations are our own groupings.
To use a different example, take the color-spectrum. It can be partitioned
into colors in a number of ways. Speakers of different languages and even
different individuals of the same linguistic community will do so differently
(Hardin [1988]; Block [1999]; Tye [2006a], [2006b], [2007]; Byrne and Hilbert
[2007]; Cohen et al. [2006]). Again, the natural way of describing this is to say
that color property-tokens exist independently of us (for simplicity, I leave
aside the issues about relationalist theories of color here), but the property-
type ‘blue’ or ‘green’ does not exist independently of us; they come about if we
group some property-tokens together under the label of ‘green’ or ‘blue’.
Note that if someone thinks that there is a fact of the matter about where
the ‘true’ boundaries of the regions of this property-space lie, like the propon-
ents of (a) and (b) do, then these true boundaries are supposed to justify the
pragmatic relevance of carving up the property-space this way. If there is an
objective, mind-independent common denominator among some property-
tokens, then treating them as instantiations of one and the same property-
type will clearly be pragmatically useful. But the picture I am presenting here
proceeds the other way round. Some property-tokens are pragmatically useful
to group together. And this explains why we consider these property-tokens
to be instantiations of the same property-type. In my picture, it is not the
objective, mind-independent existence of property-types that explains why
these property-types are pragmatically useful, but our pragmatically useful
way of grouping property-tokens constitutes what we consider property-types.
Two aspects of this metaphysical picture need to be highlighted. First, I said
that property-types are our grouping of property-tokens. But couldn’t we
group together really distant property-tokens, if we wanted to? We could.
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But remember that these groupings are supposed to serve some kind of
practical purpose. We could group together stars from various distant parts
of the firmament, but that would hardly be called a constellation, let alone a
constellation that could serve any practical purpose. To go back to David
Lewis’s distinction between sparse and abundant properties (that is,
property-types), my claim amounts to denying that there is any ontological
difference between sparse and non-sparse property-types; there is no fact of
the matter that would tell us which property-types are sparse and which ones
are merely abundant. But there is a huge practical difference between
property-types (see Taylor [1993], [2004] and Goodman [1955] for similar
distinctions).
Second, shouldn’t we group together exactly resembling property-tokens?
The answer is that we should. But then wouldn’t these exactly resembling
property-tokens constitute a property-type that exists independently of us
and where there is a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs
to this property-type? If so, wouldn’t this bring us back to the less radical
view of (b)?
The answer is this: If super-determinates do not exist, then there is no such
thing as exactly resembling property-tokens, so we should not try to group
them together. But even if they exist and there are exactly resembling prop-
erty-tokens, we are in a very bad position to even try to group them together as
their exact resemblance is extremely unlikely to be accessible to epistemic
agents like us. Suppose that the property-tokens we are interested in are the
weight of some entities. In order for two of these property-tokens to be the
same, two entities would have to be of exactly the same weight—not just in
grams, but in milligrams, micrograms, nanograms, picograms, etc. But then
we are not in the position to tell whether two of these property-tokens are
exactly resembling—we just do not have the means to measure them ‘exactly’.
In short, property-types that group only perfectly resembling property-tokens
together have very limited uses in science.
Thus, we have a metaphysical picture where property-tokens exist
independently of us, but property-types do not. I did not intend to give any
argument in favour of this metaphysical picture here. I aimed to show that
it is not to be dismissed in favour of the other two views, (a) and (b),
about the relation between property-tokens and property-types. And, depend-
ing on how we think about the causal relevance of (determinable) properties or
the existence (and epistemic accessibility) of super-determinates, it may be
the most attractive such view. In any case, my aim here is to carve out a
new position in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, so I will now
set metaphysics aside and move on to a detailed articulation of such a
position.
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4 Singularist Semirealism
We have seen that scientific realism is the view according to which there is
always a fact of the matter about whether the representations that science
gives us are correct. How should we interpret this view if we accept the meta-
physical picture I outlined in the previous section?
First of all, we need to make a distinction between singular and non-
singular representations. Singular representations attribute property-tokens
(to particulars). Non-singular representations attribute property-types (to
particulars or sometimes to other property-types). Here is a non-singular rep-
resentation: ‘Japanese cars are reliable’. Here is a singular representation: ‘my
Honda in front of my house has this shade of grey’. Only particulars show up
in a singular representation, whereas non-singular representations are not
exclusively about particulars.
Now remember that according to the metaphysical picture I outlined in the
previous section, property-tokens exist independently of us, but property-
types do not. In other words, whether we should accept scientific realism
depends on whether the concept of representation in the formulation of sci-
entific realism is to be interpreted as singular or non-singular representation.
If it is to be interpreted as singular representation, then scientific realism is
true: there is always a fact of the matter about whether these singular repre-
sentations are correct. Singular representations attribute property instances to
entities and there is always a fact of the matter about whether these entities in
fact have these property-tokens.
But if the concept of representation in the formulation of scientific realism is
to be interpreted as non-singular representation, then scientific realism is false:
there is no fact of the matter about whether these representations are correct.
Should we then give up scientific realism? My proposal is that we should
give up half of it, but keep the other half: we should give up scientific realism
about property-types and non-singular representations but keep scientific
realism about property-tokens and singular representations. That is why
I call this view singularist semirealism.
Consider Carl Hempel’s famous characterization of the vocabulary of
science:
The vocabulary of science has two basic functions: first, to permit an
adequate description of the things and events that are the objects of
scientific investigation; second, to permit the establishment of general
laws or theories by means of which particular events may be explained
and predicted and thus scientifically understood. (Hempel [1965], p. 139)
If we accept singularist semirealism, then these two ‘functions’ of the vocabu-
lary of science need to be kept separate. The first function is a descriptive one;
we can describe ‘the things and events that are the objects of scientific
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investigation’ correctly or incorrectly. But the second function is not descrip-
tive at all; it consists of the postulation of ‘general laws or theories’.
Singularist semirealism then makes a positive and a negative claim. The
positive claim is that there is always a fact of the matter about whether sin-
gular representations are correct. And the negative claim is that there is no fact
of the matter about whether non-singular representations are correct.2
Singularist semirealism sides with scientific realism in endorsing the positive
claim; no scientific realists should have any problems with the positive claim.
But singularist semirealism sides with scientific antirealism when it comes to
the negative claim. In this sense, it aims to provide the ‘best of both worlds’.
Of the two claims, the negative one is the harder to swallow. Scientific laws
are about property-types. So are general causal claims and other generaliza-
tions. Is singularist semirealism then committed to saying that there is no fact
of the matter about whether scientific laws (and general causal claims and
other generalizations) are correct? The short answer is: yes. The long answer
will have to wait until Section 6.
More on the negative claim. I said that there is no fact of the matter about
whether non-singular representations are correct. This will do as a slogan, but
there are three ways in which this claim needs to be clarified and qualified.
First, we can and do make true and false claims about non-singular repre-
sentations. I have just made (a hopefully true) one myself when I claimed that
there is no fact of the matter about whether non-singular representations are
correct. But note that the claim singularist semirealism makes is not that there
is no fact of the matter about non-singular representations at all, but a more
limited one: there is no fact of the matter about whether non-singular repre-
sentations are correct.
Second, some non-singular representations are correct by definition. Here is
an example: particulars that instantiate the property-type red instantiate the
property-type red. Here is another one: particulars that instantiate the prop-
erty-type scarlet instantiate the property-type red. So a more precise formu-
lation of my claim would be to say that there is no fact of the matter about
whether not analytically correct non-singular representations are correct. For
simplicity, I will go on using the shorter formulation in what follows.
Third, is there a fact of the matter about super-determinable property-
types? Is there a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs
to, or is an instantiation of, a super-determinable property-type?
2 Anjan Chakravartty sometimes expresses very similar views. For example, he writes that ‘nature
is composed of distributions of property instances, only some of whose patterns of sociability we
consider and investigate’ (Chakravartty [2007], p. 178). But his general stance is far more realist
than the singularist semirealist view I am defending. Immediately before the quoted sentence, for
example, he writes that ‘what is natural goes well beyond what is useful, convenient or inter-
esting in everyday and scientific contexts’ (ibid.).
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Although, as we have seen, it is not at all clear whether there are super-
determinates, it seems less controversial that there are super-determinables-
property-types with no further determinable. It is not clear what they are;
maybe being colored or having an extension are super-determinables but
it is also possible that there is only one super-determinable, namely, being—
and being colored, and so on are its determinates (McDaniel [2009]). Without
getting entangled in these metametaphysical questions, I need to qualify my
slogan: regardless of what we take to be super-determinable property-types,
there is indeed a fact of the matter about whether a property-token belongs to
(is an instantiation of) super-determinable property-types.
There is indeed a fact of the matter about whether the blue property-token
of my left eye is a color-property (if we take being colored to be a super-
determinable). Or, if we endorse the view that there is only one super-
determinable, there is indeed a fact of the matter about whether the blue
property-token of my left eye is a property. Is this a significant concession?
I don’t think so—at least not when it comes to singularist semirealism
and the claim that there is no fact of the matter about non-singular
representation. What representation would attribute a super-determinable
property-type? The representation of an entity as colored? Or the representa-
tion of an entity as existent? Representations of this kind are unlikely to
play any role in any conceivable scientific explanations. Even though there
is a fact of the matter about super-determinable property-types, representa-
tions involving these property-types are unlikely to show up in actual scientific
theories.
In the light of these clarifications and qualifications, a more precise formu-
lation of the negative claim of singularist semirealism would be to say that
there is no fact of the matter about whether not analytically correct and not
super-determinable non-singular representations are correct.
Finally, I need to say something about the logical relation between singular
and non-singular representations. One view about the relation between
these two kinds of representations is that non-singular representations are
logically prior: singular representations are to be derived from non-singular
ones. Singularist semirealism questions the validity of this picture.
According to the singularist semirealist, it is singular representations that
are logically prior: non-singular representations are to be derived from singu-
lar ones—and the only way to derive them is by means of the pragmatic
usefulness of the non-singular representations that are based on singular
representations.
I want to now turn to some encouragement from actual scientific practice,
before highlighting some potentially worrying and the potentially promising
consequences of singularist semirealism.
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5 Encouragement from Actual Scientific Practice
Yet another ambiguity in formulations of scientific realism that I have not
highlighted so far concerns a normative/descriptive distinction. Does scien-
tific realism make a normative or a descriptive claim? Is it a view about actual
scientific practice or about what science should be doing?
I do not intend to resolve this ambiguity here. I want to merely point out
that actual scientific practice is not irrelevant when trying to resolve the sci-
entific realism/antirealism debate. It is not irrelevant, but it is not a straight-
forward tie-breaker either. After all these caveats, let us see what actual
scientific practice tells us about the feasibility of singularist semirealism.
One important consideration comes from the experimental nature of much
of what we know as the scientific enterprise. Experiments are done on par-
ticulars with property-tokens. No experiment is done on property-types. They
manipulate property-tokens, not property-types (see Hacking [1983] for a
thorough examination of the relevance of experiments to the scientific real-
ism/antirealism debate). Measurement is also always the measurement of a
property-token and not of a property-type. So it seems that the two main tools
of actual scientific practice, experimentation and measurement, are practices
involving property-tokens and not property-types. Of course, on the basis of
the measurement of, or experimentation with, property-tokens, science pos-
tulates models, laws or general causal claims that are about property-types,
but this process needs to start with the attribution of property-tokens.
Ian Hacking famously wrote that ‘the final arbitrator in philosophy is not
how we think but what we do’ (Hacking [1983], p. 31). This may or may not be
true of philosophy in general, but it seems to be uncontroversial as a motto
about science. When we are trying to think about actual scientific practice, we
should not ask what scientists think or what they should think. We should
enquire about what they do (see also the famous opening sentence of Einstein
[1934]). And whatever they do is done on property-tokens.
The sine qua non of science is the attribution of property-tokens. This is
what makes the attribution of property-types possible to begin with. If science
is to give us a reliable, or even pragmatically useful, picture of the world, it
needs to start with correct representations of property-tokens. Scientists in
general are mainly interested in property-types and in generalizations. But the
only way to arrive at property-types and generalizations is by means of attri-
buting property-tokens—by means of experiments and measurements. True,
these property-tokens are attributed in order to formulate a more general
scientific picture. But any such enterprise must start with, and be based on,
the attribution of property-tokens.
But here is a more specific example, from a branch of science that tends to
be underrepresented in the scientific realism/antirealism debate: biology.
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Ernst Mayr’s concept of population thinking (Mayr [1959/1994]) is widely
accepted among biologists and even among philosophers of biology and it is
supposed to capture the right way of thinking about the biological domain.
But what does he mean by population thinking? Here is Mayr’s characteriza-
tion of population thinking from 1959:
Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, form populations of which
we can determine only the arithmetic mean and the statistics of variation.
Averages are merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which
the populations are composed have reality. (Mayr [1959/1994], p. 326.)
Mayr contrasts population thinking with typological thinking, according to
which ‘there are a limited number of fixed, unchangeable “ideas” underlying
the observed variability, with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is fixed
and real, while the observed variability has no [. . .] reality’ (Mayr [1959/1994],
p. 326). The contrast Mayr makes is a very sharp one: population thinking and
typological thinking are exclusive of each other (Mayr [1959/1994], pp.
326–7).
Mayr’s distinction between typological and population thinking may
appear straightforward, but in fact it has been, and could be, interpreted in
at least two ways.
Population thinking could be interpreted as an ontological claim about
entities: only the individual is real, everything else is abstraction. There are
various problems with this reading. If only the individual is real, then popu-
lations and species should be thought of as groups of individuals that lack
reality themselves. This would make much of post-Darwinian biology non-
sensical from the population thinker’s point of view. As Elliott Sober says:
If [as Mayr claims] ‘only the individuals of which the populations are
composed have reality,’ it would appear that much of population biology
has its head in the clouds. The Lotka-Volterra equations, for example,
describe the interactions of predator and prey populations. Presumably,
population thinking, properly so called, must allow that there is
something real over and above individual organisms. [It does not]
embody a resolute and ontologically austere focus on individual
organisms alone. (Sober [1980], p. 352).
Even worse, Mayr himself is certainly not nominalist about populations and
species (Mayr [1942], p. 120, Mayr [1963], p. 19). His dictum that ‘only the
individuals [. . .] have reality’ seems to flatly contradict his famous ‘biological
species concept’, which does indeed attribute reality to populations and spe-
cies. It is tempting to resolve this seeming contradiction by dismissing Mayr’s
claim about the importance of the individual in evolution as an exaggeration
or even as ‘rather silly metaphysics’ (Ariew [2008], p. 2).
Elliott Sober chooses this route when he says that ‘describing a single indi-
vidual is as theoretically peripheral to a populationist as describing the motion
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of a single molecule is to the kinetic theory of gases. In this important sense,
population thinking involves ignoring individuals . . .’ (Sober [1980], p. 370).
The conclusion he draws is that ‘population thinking endows individual or-
ganisms with more reality and with less reality than typological thinking
attributes to them’ (Sober [1980], p. 371).
This conclusion prompted some to be ‘a little confused about which one,
individuals or populations, are real’ (Ariew [2008], p. 8). It also opened up the
concept of population thinking to many diverging interpretations, some of
which seems to contradict Mayr’s original claims (Griffiths [1999], pp. 209–10;
Walsh [2006], pp. 432–3).
I argued recently that population thinking is an ontological claim
about properties and not about entities (Nanay [2010a]). For the population
thinker, only the property-tokens of individual organisms are real.
Property-types are not real.
We have to be careful when formulating this claim. The population thinker
presumably would not deny that groups of individual organisms do have
properties and these properties are real. A population of 431 geese has the
property of having the population size of 431, for example, and this property
seems very real indeed. The distinction Mayr was making is not one between
the properties of individuals and the properties of populations. Rather, it is
between individual property-tokens and property-types that can be instan-
tiated in many different entities. In short, the population thinker can acknow-
ledge the existence of populations and species. These entities are real in the
same way as individuals are real. And all of these entities have very real
property-tokens. What the population thinker denies is that there are prop-
erty-types.
In other words, Mayr’s provocative statement, according to which ‘aver-
ages are merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which the popu-
lations are composed have reality’ should be read as ‘property-types are merely
statistical abstractions; only the property-tokens of individuals (or of popula-
tions) have reality’. Mayr’s population thinking is a version of singularist
semirealism.
Note that this reading makes the apparent contradiction between popula-
tion thinking and the ‘biological species concept’ disappear. Mayr is indeed
not nominalist about species and populations; these are real entities (that have
real property-tokens). But this claim is consistent with the general framework
of singularist semirealism. We can accept singularist semirealism—thus avoid-
ing the conflict with the ‘biological species concept’.
Although Mayr does not talk about property-tokens too much and he is
not particularly clear about the metaphysical framework he presupposes, he
does write that ‘[a]ll organisms and organic phenomena are composed of
unique features and can be described collectively only in statistical terms’
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(Mayr [1959/1994], p. 326). Here Mayr talks about the uniqueness of
features—that is, properties—and not the uniqueness of individual entities.
The upshot is that individuals have ‘unique features’ (property-tokens): indi-
vidual i1 has property-token p1, i2 has p2, and so on. Suppose these individuals
form a population. The question is how to talk about the properties of these
individuals ‘collectively’. Mayr’s point is that we can only describe them
‘in statistical terms’. That is, the property-type that p1, p2, . . . pn belongs to
is a statistical abstraction; it is not a property-type that exists independently
of the specific individuals and their specific property-tokens.3
To sum up, it seems that Mayr’s population thinking is a version of singu-
larist semirealism. Those biologists who accept it as one of the cornerstones of
evolutionary biology implicitly use the singularist semirealist theoretical
framework.
Note that I gave two arguments in this section: one about experiments and
measurement being about property-tokens not property-types, and the other
about population thinking. There is an important branch of science that these
arguments leave untouched: theoretical physics. Theoretical physics (or, at
least some branches thereof) does not postulate its theories on the basis of
experiments or measurements. In other words, they do not postulate their
non-singular representations on the basis of singular representations.
Theoretical physics (or, at least some branches thereof) is not an empirical
science. The considerations from actual scientific practice then do not support
singularist semirealism in this branch of science. Further, one may wonder
about whether the considerations in Section 3 about the irrelevance of
super-determinates for actual science apply in the case of theoretical physics
(especially if, as we have just seen, theoretical physics is not constrained by
considerations concerning measurement). The reason why super-deter-
minates, even if they exist, may not be particularly interesting from the
point of view of science was that exact resemblance is unlikely to be accessible
to epistemic agents like us—it would, for example, involve comparing the
weight of two entities not just in grams, but in milligrams, micrograms, nano-
grams, picograms, and so on. But given that (certain branches of) theoretical
physics can talk about exactly resembling particulars without measuring their
properties, these considerations fail to apply in the case of this discipline.
Is this a huge problem for my account? I don’t think so. As McMullin
([1984]) pointed out, theoretical physics is not a very plausible model for the
rest of science (it needs to be noted that he exploited this fact in favour of his
version of scientific realism). Further, allowing theoretical physics to be an
exception may make more palatable an important consequence of singularist
3 See also (Nanay [2010b]) on why talking about property-types (or trait-types) in some domains
of biology could be thought to be problematic.
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semirealism, namely, that there is no fact of the matter about scientific laws: If
we accept that singularist semirealism may not apply to theoretical physics,
then there would be no such implications for the laws of theoretical physics—
arguably the most plausible candidates for scientific laws. Those who are
moved by these considerations can read all the claims about science in this
article to be about science minus theoretical physics.
6 Some Potentially Worrying Consequences of Singularist
Semirealism
After this encouragement, we now face a serious challenge: a consequence of
singularist semirealism is that there is no fact of the matter about whether
scientific laws are correct. But doesn’t this just show that singularist semire-
alism is an obviously crazy view? I don’t think so.
Scientific laws are about property-types. According to singularist semireal-
ism, there is no fact of the matter about whether representations of property-
types are correct. Property-types are our pragmatically useful ways of group-
ing property-tokens. Hence, it follows from singularist semirealism that there
is no fact of the matter about whether scientific laws are correct. I propose that
this is the right way of thinking about both property-types and scientific laws:
it is true of both of them that they are not discovered but posited by us.
David Lewis famously said that ‘laws and natural properties [that is, natural
property-types] get discovered together’ (Lewis [1983], p. 368). It follows from
singularist semirealism that this is wrong. Rather, ‘laws and natural property-
types get posited by us together’. Scientific laws are not out there waiting for
us to discover them. They are constructed by science. Does this make them any
less respectable? I don’t think so. After all, and here is where the positive claim
of singularist semirealism saves the day, scientific laws are postulated on the
basis of (presumably correct) singular representations of the world. Science
postulates scientific laws that can cover correct singular representations and,
remember, there is always a fact of the matter about whether singular repre-
sentations are correct. Scientific laws have no more objective existence than
the property-types they are supposed to be about.
But does not the rejection of the objectivity of scientific laws bring with it all
kinds of uncanny consequences? One important example: isn’t causation sup-
posed to be closely linked to the laws of nature? Again, David Lewis seems to
think so: ‘it is fairly uncontroversial that causation involves laws’ (Lewis
[1983], p. 368). Does it? Here, we need to distinguish singular and general
causal claims. Singular causal claims connect property-tokens; general causal
claims connect property-types. It is indeed uncontroversial that general causal
claims ‘involve laws’. But why would singular causal claims involve laws?
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In fact, according to singularist semirealism, there is a fact of the matter
about whether singular causal claims are true (as there is always a fact of the
matter about property-tokens). But there is no fact of the matter about
whether general causal claims are true. The relation between singular and
general causal claims is of course very complex (see Good [1961], [1962];
Sober [1985]; Carroll [1991]; Eells [1991]; Hitchcock [1995], [2001]). But if
one holds that the real causal structure of the world is captured by singular
and not by general causal claims, then singularist semirealism is not making a
crazy claim at all.
However, a disturbing fact remains: few titles of articles in Nature or
Science are singular causal claims, but many of them are general causal
claims. What should singularist semirealism say about that? It is important
to remember that singularist semirealism does not want to purge science from
general causal claims or from property-types. Property-types, scientific laws,
and general causal claims are part of science and it is difficult to imagine a
scientific theory without them. What singularist semirealism says is that these
property-types, laws and general causal claims are postulated and not dis-
covered. But this does not make these property-types, laws, general causal
claims and other generalizations any less respectable and any less capable of
allowing us to build bridges or cure cancer. According to singularist semire-
alism, it is one of the most important endeavours of science to postulate
property-types that are pragmatically useful for regimenting singular facts
and to postulate laws that are pragmatically useful for covering singular
facts. But these scientific laws and property-types are postulated on the
basis of (presumably correct) singular representations of the world. Science
postulates scientific laws that can cover correct singular representations and,
remember, there is always a fact of the matter about whether singular repre-
sentations are correct. We have no reason to mistrust the scientific laws just
because they are postulated and not ‘discovered’.
In short, attributions of property-types, most notably scientific laws and
general causal, claims are part of general scientific practice. But there is no fact
of the matter about whether they are true. They are pragmatically useful tools
at the disposal of science to group singular facts.
7 Some Promising Consequences of Singularist Semirealism
It seems that the worrying consequences of singularist semirealism were not so
worrying after all. We have to give up the claim that there is a fact of the
matter about scientific laws, but that may not be such a bad thing as long as
there is a fact of the matter about whether singular causal claims are true—as
singularist semirealism asserts.
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And there are somepromising consequences of singularist semirealism.More
specifically, although it is a version of scientific antirealism, it can give a con-
vincing answer to the main (‘ultimate’) argument against scientific antirealism.
One important challenge for any scientific antirealist is to explain the suc-
cess of science. This challenge is so significant that it has been referred to,
somewhat dramatically, as the ‘ultimate argument’ against antirealism (Van
Fraassen [1980], p. 37;Musgrave [1988]). The ‘ultimate argument’ is very simple
and its original formulation comes from Hilary Putnam (although it could be
traced back to J. J. C. Smart’s ‘cosmic coincidence’ argument, see Smart [1968],
p. 39, see also Stanford [2000], pp. 269–70; Lyons [2003]; Devitt [2008]):
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. (Putnam [1975], p. 73)
Putnam says that scientific realism is the only way to explain the success of
science. Is it? Would singularist semirealism make the success of science a
miracle? It certainly would not. Although there is no fact of the matter
about whether the laws a scientific theory postulates are true, there is a fact
of the matter about whether the singular causal claims a scientific theory
makes are true. And as the laws that scientific theories postulate are supposed
to be based on these (supposedly true) singular causal claims, it is not a miracle
that scientific theories can make successful predictions and explanations.
Remember that for singularist semirealism, property-types are our ways of
grouping property-tokens. Some groupings are more useful from a pragmatic
point of view than others; they allow us to make better predictions and
explanations. And, importantly, what is supposed to be grouped by these
property-types are property-tokens and there is, again, always a fact of
the matter about whether a particular has a property-token. But if this is
true, then the ultimate argument against scientific antirealism does not work
in the case of singularist semirealism.
It is important to clarify how the realist half of singularist semirealism can
save this view from the no miracles argument. According to singularist semire-
alism, non-singular representations—laws, generalizations—are postulated on
the basis of correct singular representations. And then we make predictions on
thebasis of these non-singular representations that are, in turn, basedon correct
singular representations. Thus, these predictions are—indirectly—based on
correct representations, namely, correct singular representations. Hence, it is
by no means a miracle that these predictions have a higher probability of suc-
ceeding than chance. They succeed because they are (with the mediation of
non-singular representations) based on correct (singular) representations.
The realist can push the no-miracles argument even further: wouldn’t these
‘mediating’ non-singular representations need to be correct in order to ground
our better-than-chance predictions? The answer is that they wouldn’t.
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Remember: these non-singular representations are posited on the basis of our
correct singular representations precisely in order to give better than chance
predictions. They are posited for their pragmatic usefulness (for the purpose of
predictions and explanations), not for their correctness.
8 Conclusion: Theory Change
My aimwas to argue for a compromise between scientific realism and scientific
antirealism. I argued that we should be realist about singular representations
and antirealist about non-singular ones. In this sense, it could be considered to
be ‘the best of both worlds’.
In conclusion, I want to compare my ‘best of both worlds’ compromise in
the scientific realism/antirealism debate with the original ‘best of both worlds’
compromise: structural realism. According to structural realism, we should be
realist about structure but not about anything else (I leave aside the differences
between different versions of structural realism and the difficulties with cash-
ing out what is meant by ‘structure’). According to structural realism, what is
preserved through theory change is the structure. And this is what blocks one
of the most influential arguments against scientific realism, the ‘pessimistic
meta-induction’, according to which as our past scientific theories have turned
out to be false, we have no reason to believe that our present scientific theories
are true (Laudan [1981]; Psillos [1999]). As structural realists claim that the
structure of scientific theories (at least sometimes) survive theory change, they
can block this argument easily: at least some of our past theories were not
entirely wrong—they did get the structure right.
According to singularist semirealism, what is (typically) preserved through
theory change are singular representations. But non-singular representations
are (typically) not preserved. Note that this account can also block the
pessimistic meta-induction argument. As singular representations do survive
theory change, our past theories were not entirely wrong; they got the
singular representations right. I am not sure that the ‘pessimistic meta-induc-
tion’ is as strong an argument as it is sometimes supposed but it is worth
emphasizing that my account can handle it as well as the structural realist
can. The compromise singularist semirealism offers between scientific
realism and anti-realism is very different from the one structural realism
does.
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